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The Morality of The Common Law
G. H. L. FRIDMAN*
This essay is about the problem of determining the possibility and 
nature of a connection between morality and law. Its purpose is to 
indicate, by reference largely to some recent problems of the law of 
contract and the law of torts, the way in which judges are compelled 
to look at the nature of the common lav> system in order to extract 
some basic principles, from which decisions can be made in different 
instances. The argument is put forward that such principles are culled 
from the innate morality of the common law, which itself is a 
product of society in general and the legal nature of that society in 
particular. Justice, indeed, is what the judges declare it to be: in 
making such declarations the judges are governed by what they f in d  to 
be the fundamental concepts of legal rules — and these concepts are 
variable.
THE ISSUE STATED
Jurisprudence is not a reserved occupation; reserved, that is, for 
some select few, who indulge in a remote, grandiose, mysterious form 
of celebration, and live in a rarified atmosphere in which we lesser 
beings involved in the law cannot be expected to breathe and survive. 
Jurisprudence is what goes on in the courts every day. Nor do I mean 
“jurisprudence” as that term is employed by civil lawyers. I mean the 
philosophy of law. Inevitably, this must be part of the everyday life 
of almost every lawyer, especially those who occupy judicial positions. 
Professor Dworkin’s dichotomy, between “hard cases” and others,1 is a 
little forced. There are more such “hard cases” than might be thought. 
And, at least from time to time, every judge has to become something 
like the “Hercules” of Dworkin’s imagination.
A recent illustration of the importance and relevance of “juris­
prudence” can be found in the case o f Nissan Auto Co. (Canada) Ltd. 
v. Pelletier.2 This concerned the question of whether the Quebec 
legislature could validly abolish representation of a party by counsel
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in the Provincial Court, Small Claims Division. In reaching his decision — 
that the abolition was not ultra vires — Deschenes, C.J., canvassed the 
relevance of natural law, positive law, and the fundam ental freedom 
of the citizen. He held that natural law was not just a figment o f the 
imagination of legal philosophers, but in fact governed, and indeed 
was part of, the positive law of Quebec and Canada.
T he plain fact of the m atter is that when certain issues fall to be 
determ ined by a court, the question o f what is the law is bound up 
with the purpose to be served by the law. In other words, Why is 
the law what it is? Or, What ought the law to be? These questions, 
in their turn, cannot be considered in isolation. They must be looked at 
in connection with what I may term the justification o f the law. By 
this I mean the ultimate rationale for any given legal rule or principle 
in particular, or for the entire body of the law in general. This is 
the central issue in jurisprudence; to elucidate the justification of law 
is at the same time to explain what law is. The nature o f such elucidation 
depends very much upon the standpoint from which one makes the 
enquiry. Is he a philosopher, sociologist, theologian, lawyer? How he 
approaches the issue will influence his ultimate response.
From the lawyer’s point of view, I would suggest that there are 
basically two main approaches to the problem of the justification of law.3 
First o f all, it is possible to achieve this by looking at the technical, 
legal, and internally logical bases of the law. Secondly, it can be done 
by ignoring such matters, regarding them as relevant only to the resolu­
tion of problems arising within a legal system, and appertaining only 
to the more concrete principles of any such system. Instead, the law is 
justified by appealing to what may be termed meta-legal, or extra-legal, 
facts or doctrines. Theories belonging in the first category are those 
which are more positivist in nature, seeking to exclude from considera­
tion everything that is in any way emotive, laden with value, or possibly 
irrational and illogical, and almost certainly bound up with individual 
preferences as to the content of the law. Theories in the second 
category are those which invoke such doctrines as natural law, or rely 
heavily upon sociological considerations or similar emphases.
Positivism is a logical possibility but a practical absurdity, and so much 
so that it is not altogether easy to identify any m odern writer on legal 
theory as a positivist pure and simple, since, if you scratch the back 
of a positivist, you will find that he is really a non-positivist. Some 
self-professed proponents o f the more positivist notion or approach to 
law have attempted to describe a concept or ideal model of law, or o f a 
legal system, that is wholly self-explanatory, and does not depend upon 
any extrinsic factors. That, at least, is the theory. It is, indeed, the 
aim or intent of the writers in question. However, it seems to me — as it 
has seemed to many others — that to provide an explanation that goes
*J. C. Smith, Legal Obligation (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press. 1976), pp. 4-17 gives four basic 
theories, viz., derivative, coercive, formal, and debunking. It seems to me that these merely involve 
variations o f the original two theories.
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so far, and no further, on the ground that beyond a certain point 
the inquiry ceases to belong to the realm of legal o r jurisprudential 
thought, is not entirely helpful. Nor, perhaps, is it totally honest; the 
basis such writers put forward as the terminus ad quem or a quo of 
their investigations is often one that directly and purposefully involves 
some such extra-legal concepts and discussion. Their explanation is 
unsatisfactory beyond a certain point — which is not to say that their 
investigations do not throw some light upon the nature of law. I am 
simply suggesting that they are incomplete. Incomplete, that is, out of the 
choice of the writer. What these writers are saying, in effect, is that 
to go further requires certain empirical investigations o f a different 
character from the analytical study hitherto pursued.
With the niceties o f this debate, and the sometimes difficult problem 
of determ ining the precise nature of an individual legal philosopher’s 
approach to the issues in hand,4 I am not directly concerned. What 
does concern me is the issue of the morality of the law. In other 
words, can it be correct to seek the justification for law in principles 
of morality? Is this, in fact, inevitable? In speaking of “law”, in this 
context, I am confining myself to the common law; i.e., to judge-made 
law, or, perhaps a little more broadly, to the way in which judges 
interpret and apply law, whether it be initially judge-m ade law or 
statutory in origin. Obviously, whatever a legislature enacts may have 
almost any kind of justification in the wide sense. In the narrow sense, 
it is “justified” in terms of the legislative competence of the body in 
question (e.g., is it an enactment of the Parliament of Canada acting 
under the British North America Act, or of the Legislature of Ontario 
acting intra vires?). We cannot really presume to discuss the justification 
of legislation except in the narrowest ‘echnical way. But we can, and 
must, look at the justification o f the lav which is made by the judges. 
I am speaking, naturally, of the system with which I am the most 
familiar — i.e., the law in common law countries, those which have 
derived their systems from England. It is really that system of which 
legal philosophers in England and the United States are talking when 
they discuss the nature o f law and legal thinking.5
*E.g., is Hart's concept of law truly a type of positivism, minus the sanction theory of Austin? 
O r does it depend on some sort o f moral foundation, even if it is not that of the natural lawyer? 
C f Lovin, H .LA. Hart and the Morality of Law, (1976) 21 Am. J. Ju r. 131. Do the efforts of 
Dworkin and J. C. Smith to explain law in terms o f "ordinary language analysis" approximate 
more to the logical analysis of law or the non-logical extra-logical analysis?
‘Continental writers, with the possible exception of Kelsen, because they start from a different basis, 
inevitably end, I would suggest, with a totally different outlook on such questions. This is not 
surprising in view o f the comparative (but not absolute) difference in the situation and powers of 
courts in their countries (as contrasted with England, Canada, and the United States, and the other 
countries ot the common law system), lh e re  is, 1 suggest, a jurisprudential issue connected with 
the recognition o f this judicial power by such diverse writers as Austin, Hart, Dworkin and Kelsen. 
In some way or another, by reasoning which fits in with their varied positivist approaches to law, 
they explain satisfactorily — to themselves at any rate — how and why law may validly be made by 
judges, in o ther systems there may be less need for some philosophical explanation, since the 
powers o f courts in such systems may be (a) more limited, or (b) more explicitly contained within 
the structure of the legal system. A good illustration o f the latter is Switzerland, where courts 
have the constitutional power to determine “hard" cases — ie., where no positive law exists, by 
behaving as if they were legislatures and creating law for the situation.
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For the Anglo-Canadian or American lawyer, therefore, the crux 
of the question, What is law?, or of the problem of discovering the 
justification of law, is to be found in the nature and functioning of 
the judicial system. In other words, it relates to, and stems from, the 
extent to which courts lay down the law. Not only is it necessary to 
enquire how and why they do so, it is also vital to consider the 
reasons behind their exercise of this power. On what philosophical, 
or judicial basis, therefore, do courts in our legal system determine 
what the law shall be? To what school of jurists, it may be asked, 
do the judges belong? My suggestion — for which I claim no great 
originality of thought — is that there is indeed some crucial, even 
innate, connection or relation between law and morality. However, the 
problem is to define and expound the nature of this morality, its 
sources, and its content.
THE LIMITS OF THE ISSUE
Much, if not all, of the debate that has gone on in past years on 
the relationship of law and morals, or morality, seems to have turned 
on such matters as whether suicide, abortion, homosexuality, and so 
forth, ought to involve criminal liability; or, whether it is proper to 
obey a law which is deemed offensive to morality, even though the law 
may have been enacted or created by a body having authority to do so 
under the specific legal system (e.g., as with the case o f Nazi Germany).6 
With the greatest respect for those who have engaged in such contro­
versies, I would suggest that to discuss the problem in such terms 
and along such lines is almost to create your straw men in order to 
knock them down easily; that is, to fashion the problem in a m anner 
which permits you to arrive at the answer you intended to achieve 
before setting out upon the discussion. In the context in which I am 
considering this question — namely, what the courts do, and how they 
create law — these are not entirely legitimate issues, even though they 
may influence the content and nature of the debate to which I have 
referred.
So far as concerns, for instance, the problem of the laws of Nazi 
Germany, the question may well depend on how the issue is raised. 
If it is asked, in an abstract sense, whether the laws passed by Nazis 
were valid German law, the answer must be that, within that system, 
and as long as the laws were passed in accordance with the current 
constitution, such laws were valid. As long as Germany was a state 
for the purposes of international law, and enacted legislation in conformity 
with its own legal structure, no one within that system could legitimately
•H art, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra; Fuller, Posittvtsm and Fidelity of Law — 
A Reply to Professor Hart, (1958) 71 Harv. L.R. 630; Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1954), and Law and Morals (Birmingham: Holdsworth Chib of the University 
of Birmingham, 1961); Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962); Fuller, 
The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964), especially chap. III.
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refuse to obey. It might be morally obligatory to do so, and even 
praiseworthy to do so. Indeed, the most laudable activity would have 
been to destroy the system which permitted the passage of such laws. 
And, it might be added, refusal to obey such laws might have pre­
cluded liability under international law for wrongs committed as a conse­
quence of obedience to the Nazi state and its legal system. Whereas 
obedience, while it meant that the party in question was behaving 
legitimately according to German law, was misbehaving, and acting 
criminally, as later declared according to international law.
However, it is one thing to say that the laws of Nazi Germany 
may have conflicted with the principles o f international law, and quite 
another to say that they were not valid laws. The situation might be 
different if the law of a given state recognises that international 
law is part of its own law. On the other hand, if we ask whether 
a court, after the fall o f Nazi Germany, should recognise its laws, 
the answer may well be different. An international court, such as that 
at Nuremberg, is fully entitled to disallow the validity o f Nazi legisla­
tion and refuse to accept it as an excuse for behaviour that is criminal 
under international law. If it is a German court that is faced with this 
issue, it could be that subsequent legal developments in Germany permit 
the court to refuse or deny recognition to Nazi legislation, on some 
legal basis required by the post-Nazi system. Finally, if the court is a 
non-German court, the position may be clearer. Indeed, in a recent 
case,7 the House o f Lords refused to recognise Nazi legislation depriving 
Jews o f their German nationality, on the ground that to do so was against 
the public policy o f England; i.e., it was contrary to English law to 
accept such legislation by a foreign country, otherwise perfectly valid, 
as being binding.
Such matters as whether suicide should be a crime, or homo­
sexuals should be prosecuted, are examples of issues not for courts 
but for legislatures. It is true that, from time to time, certain aspects 
of these, or similar moral issues, are raised in the inevitable course of 
deciding other legal problems. For example, it might be said that the 
law of negligence in tort, or the duties of a fiduciary towards his bene­
ficiaries (especially in regard to the way the concept of a fiduciary 
has been enlarged in recent years by the courts),8 raise moral issues. 
So, also, where a court has to decide whether to recognise and enforce 
a contract that has as its purpose something which is arguably immoral; 
for instance, a contract to provide homosexual services by one adult to 
another; or a contract whereby a man and woman cohabit and agree 
as to the sharing of certain property.9 Similarly, where a person would 
inherit property on the death of X, but that inheritor is in fact the 
m urderer of X, on what basis does, or should, the law deny the
7Oppenheimer v. CattermoU, [1976] A.C. 249.
1Regal (Hastmgs) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1942] 1 A ll  E.R. 378; Readmg v. AG .. [1951] A.C. 507; 
Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46; Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 
371; Abbey Glen Property Corp. v. Stumborg (1976), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 235; Evans v. Anderson, [1977] 
2 W.W.R. 385; H. L. Misener U  Sons Ltd. v. Misener (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 428.
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inheritance? This is a problem that has been raised by Professor Dworkin 
to illustrate the workings of his doctrine o f law — which is sharply 
in contrast with the positivist notions of Professor Hart.
Professor Hart would eschew any introduction of ideas of morality 
into the juristic discussion of law. For him, the concept of law owes 
nothing to, and is not directly involved with, issues of morality. 
Hence, for many others, including Professor Dworkin, his analysis of 
“law” leaves many gaps. It fails to deal with the situation where there 
is no recognised — or recognisable — rule for determining an issue. 
It leaves much to something akin to “judicial discretion” (which has 
sometimes been described as “a little black box”).10 Dworkin seeks to 
dispose of the problem by a different analysis, which, in one sense, 
also avoids any appeal to morality, but, in another sense, is in effect 
an alternative way of invoking morality without directly identifying it as 
such. Dworkin’s notion of principles, as distinct from rules, envisages 
the existence or creation o f such principles by the courts, which cull 
them from the law itself in some mysterious way (which Dworkin has 
strenuously, but, I would suggest, unsuccessfully, striven to elucidate 
and analyse). Such principles — for example, the one about not making 
a profit from one’s own wrongdoing, which resolves the difficult issue 
of the m urderer who, according to the strict rule of law, ought to 
inherit — are themselves part and parcel o f the law, not introduced 
ab extra. 11 The attempts by Dworkin to explain the nature and functioning 
of the law constitute an endeavour to retain the attitude of a positivist 
while, at the same time, making the juridical or jurisprudential nature 
of law less formalistic and rule-oriented, more self-sufficient and self- 
explanatory.12
Such endeavours, admirable though they may be, and stimulating 
though they have been, as evidenced by the quantity of critical writing 
that has emerged in the past decade (much, if not all, of it devoted 
to the suggestions of Hart and Dworkin),13 involve controversy about
•in  the United States recently, the latter type o f agreement, which once would have been thought 
o f as invalid (being against public policy, since it promoted illicit intercourse), has become accepted 
as valid and operative. Legislation has achieved much the same result in some jurisdictions, 
(e.g., Ontario, under the Family Law Reform Act, 1978). On the subject of immoral contracts, see Dwyer, 
Immoral Contracts, (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 386. It may be regarded as still doubtful whether a contract 
for homosexual cohabitation would be equally as acceptable.
“ Hart, The Concept of Law, supra, chaps. VII, VIII and IX.
“ Does this mean that Dworkin's theory is that the law is parthenogenetic?
“ See Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, (1963) 60 J. Phil. 624; The Model of Rules, (1967) 35 U. Chi. L.R. 14; 
Social Rules and Legal Theory, (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 855; Hard Cases, supra; Taking Rights Seriously, supra.
"M cCallum, Dworkin on Judicial Discretion, (1963) 60 J. Phil. 638; Sartorius, The Justification of the 
Judicial Decision, (1968) 78 Ethics 171; Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, (1971) 8 Am. Phil. Q. 151; 
Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 823; Greenwaldt, Discretion and 
Judicial Decision, (1975) 75 Col. L.R. 359; Reynolds, Dworktn as Quixote, (1975) 123 U. Pen. L.R. 574; 
Steiner, Judicial Discretion and the Concept of Law, (1976) 35 Cam. L.J. 135; Notes, Dworktn's Rights 
Thesis, (1976) 74 Mich. L.R. 1167; Hart. Law m the Perspective of Philosophy, (1976) 51 N.Y.U.L.R. 538; 
Sober, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, (1977) 75 Mich. L.R. 473; 
Richards, Taking ‘Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously, (1977) 52 N.Y.U.L.R. 1265; Weinreb, Law as 
Order, (1978) 91 Harv. L.R. 909.
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unreal issues. I have already questioned the utility of discussing some 
of what may be called the traditional issues of the relation between 
law and morality. So far as concerns the more practical issues — such 
as those which I have mentioned about enforcing certain contracts, 
or developing the law relating to fiduciaries and their duties — the 
connection between morals or morality, in the strictest, narrowest 
sense, on the one hand, and the doctrines and rules of the law, on 
the other, is something which I hope will become clearer later on. 
For reasons which will emerge, I do not find very helpful the writings 
of those authors who seek to set up idealised models of a legal system 
and test actual legal systems thereby. Professor H art’s vision of the law is, 
with respect, much removed from reality (although it has a certain 
appeal from the point o f view of its abstract, logical approach). 
Professor Dworkin’s novel — or perhaps pseudo-novel — theories are 
equally abstract, and suffer from the additional disadvantage of being 
more complex, requiring some very artificial reasoning and the acceptance 
of some strange, even awkward, notions. While both writers have 
been raised in the common law system and, presumably, are endeavouring 
to explain and describe a concept of law that will fit such a system 
(and perhaps may not fit any other system), it seems to me that, unless 
and until some of the difficulties and inconsistencies inherent in their 
views have been solved or eradicated, they have not provided a final, 
definitive analysis which enables the lawyers of the common law system 
to differentiate morality from law, and relate these two models of 
explaining or describing human behaviour to each other.
It is with the common law that I am concerned. Hence, for the 
English, and therefore the Canadian or American, lawyer, it is central 
to his understanding of the law and the legal process to appreciate 
what the courts do, and the extent to which they are the respositories 
and the progenitors o f law. Although a trem endous quantity o f our law 
is now statutory or quasi-statutory in character, as compared with a 
century or two ago, it is still fundamentally true to say that the courts 
are an important source o f the law. The powers, position, and functions 
of a court in the common law system make that system what it is, and 
serve to differentiate it in character and philosophy from others. This 
perhaps explains why jurists emanating from that system have such a 
different approach to the philosophy of law from jurists trained else­
where. Jurists perhaps, but not necessarily judges. It is my thesis 
that the judges of the common law are less positivist or realist than 
the legal philosophers o f the common law, (which, perhaps, is why those 
philosophers have such great difficulties today). If the common law had 
been quite as positivist, empirical, and realist as the writers have 
attempted to show, there might not have been such great disputes 
about the common law system. It is the judges who have thrown askew 
the neat theories o f the philosophers.
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THE TASK OF THE JUDGE
To understand the modus operandi of the common law, it is necessary 
to begin from a simple, elementary point. The judicial oath in common 
law countries, however it is precisely worded, usually requires the judge 
to administer justice or to do right according to law. This involves two 
distinct ideas. On the one hand, the judge is to do right, to achieve 
justice, a just result. But, at the same time, he must do so by applying 
the law. He is not free to do whatever he wishes, or to decide a 
case in accordance with his own prejudices, interests, feelings or dis­
position. Everyone would agree that to do right, or justice, is the aim 
of the law. But what is “right”? What is “justice”? To the Nazis, 
justice was National Socialist justice. To communists, justice is Marxist, 
or Leninist, or Stalinist, o r Maoist justice. To us, o r to many of us, 
the concept of justice possesses inherent moral features or harmonies. 
It was put slightly differently, or more specifically, by the Romans. 
To the Em peror Justinian, “justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius 
suum cuique tribuens”14: Giving every man his due. In other words 
treating every man as he deserves (in which case, as Hamlet says,15 
who would escape whipping) or, perhaps, to be a little more precise, 
and more in keeping with some form of the judicial oath, to give every 
man his “right”.
This leads straight into the whole concept of legal rights. For 
only when a person has a right (however that be defined or understood), 
will he have any entitlement at the hands of the court, or from such 
other official as administers the particular aspect o f the law that is 
involved. This line of enquiry, I suggest, leads to a paradox. The 
judges are bound to administer justice according to law. That is to say 
they are to enforce rights created by the law. They are therefore 
bound by the law, in the same • way as all of us, whether litigants, 
accused persons, officials or others, are bound. All save the Queen 
(and even she in some respects) are bound and governed by the law — 
at least in our system. 1 hat is, in part at least, what we mean by the rule 
of law. However, it is the judges who declare what the law is. Hence, 
the judges are only bound by whatever they say they are bound by. 
The justice they pursue and administer is justice according to what they 
declare to be justice, which seems to negate the very idea o f justice and 
law. How can this apparent paradox be resolved?
This question is at the heart of the recent debates arising out of 
H art’s statement of his concept of law made nearly twenty years ago. H art’s 
book has become the central piece of writing in m odern jurisprudential 
theory and discussion. It is the vortex of neopositivism. The problem
“ Moyle, J.E., ed., Imprralons justiniam Institutumrm Libri Quattuor (5th ed., Oxford, 1923). Book I, 
Title I, Prmdfnum.
“ Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, Act II. sc. 2.
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is really one of dealing jurisprudentially with the question of cases 
that do not readily subsume themselves under any recognised, accepted 
rule o f law. In other words, when a judge has to “make” the law 
which he administers in order to achieve a just result, can what he is 
doing be brought within the framework o f a positivist explanation of 
law? O r must it be admitted, albeit regretfully, that such an explanation 
cannot cope with such instances, with the result that at least part of 
the law is not amenable to any logical, structural exposition, but remains 
within the domain of some possibly metaphysical explanation?
With the various scholarly attempts to resolve this problem over the 
past few years I am not concerned. Instead, I am interested in the 
way the judges themselves resolve their difficulty — which, perhaps, 
they do not perceive of as being a difficulty! They are bound to achieve 
a just result; they are bound by the law, and they cannot simply say 
“There is no law, therefore we cannot supply an answer”. They must 
find an answer, even where there is no statute (or similar piece of 
legislation) that tells the judge what to do, and where there is no earlier 
case law which provides similar guidance.
Let me make clear that I am talking about two different kinds 
of cases (which I do not think is done by the writers previously 
mentioned, who seem to think, in my view, that the problem only 
arises where there is no prior law — so-called “hard” or “problem” 
cases). First of all, the case may be one of “first impression”; i.e., 
a case governed by no existing legal rule. This may be because it is 
totally new and unforeseen by previous legislation or decision, or because 
it may involve a conflict of rules (or, in the terminology of Dworkin, a 
conflict of rules and principles — which other writers have suggested 
is not really the case, since rules are principles, and vice versa). 
Secondly, a case may raise a problem because there is an answer, 
which is dictated by previous legislation — or more frequently, earlier 
decisions — and the strict, logical application of the canons of con­
struction of statutes and documents, or o f precedents, will lead to a 
certain result. Yet, at the same time, the judge thinks that to apply 
such doctrines in their full force may lead to the regulation of the 
case by law, but hardly to the achievement of a just result — or, in 
other words, to the administration of justice.
In both types of cases, even the first, it may be possible to 
determine the issue by accepted doctrines such as that of precedent. 
All that may be required, even in the first type of case, is a logical 
extension, or a linguistic re-interpretation, of a prior law or rule. 
To do so, however, and to produce thereby a certain result, may offend 
the judge’s innate sense of propriety or justice. Or, it may involve him 
in a conflict between what he perceives of as being “legal” (i.e., 
within the ambit of the legal system he is applying), and what he under­
stands as “reasonable” or “fair”. Some legal rules are sufficiently 
flexible or nebulous to permit the maximum amount of freedom to a
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judge to achieve a just result without undergoing the traumatic experience 
of the kind of conflict I have been describing. Others are more rigid, 
and their logical application may produce consequences that are not 
harmonious with “justice”. The problem, and its resolution, may be illus­
trated by some examples collected from the law of contracts and the 
law of torts, all of which are highly topical and very much in dispute 
at the present time.
ILLUSTRATIONS
A contract is an agreement between two or more persons that is 
made in accordance with certain requisites of the common law, such as 
offer and acceptance, consideration, and possibly writing. Once the 
parties have agreed with sufficient certainty on the terms o f their 
agreement, a binding obligation is created. Over the centuries, the 
courts made plain that consent was vital. Yet consent, once given, was 
fully effective even if the party consenting did not fully appreciate 
to what he had given his consent, as long as he had been given a 
chance to know what that was. Hence, if there was some mistake which 
affected his ability to consent, o r some fraud or physical coercion, the 
party thus subjected to some manipulation of his will to consent might 
be able to plead that he ought not to be bound by the ensuing 
obligation. In the absence of such factors, however, once a party 
agreed to terms proposed by the other party, the form er was bound to 
perform or pay damages in default. What if the contract was not 
beneficial to one party? What if he had bargained on certain 
assumptions as to the future, as to his present position, or as to the 
meaning of the contract, and these turn out to have been unfounded 
(although there was no mistake, fraud, etc.)} The rule o f the 
common law was clear: once a contract is made and is originally valid, 
it remains valid and enforceable whatever happens.
Because of the insistence that bargains once made must be kept 
(in the absence of say, fraud), if one party agreed to exonerate the 
other party from any, or any special kind of, liability in respect of a 
breach of that other party’s obligations under the contract, such an 
agreement would bind the one exempting the other from the liability. 
Hence, a man might suffer loss through the other party’s breach of 
contract, and not be able to claim any compensation (or might have the 
recoverable compensation limited to a small, even a derisory sum). 
The logic o f contractual doctrine led inevitably to the conclusion that a 
party to a contract could preclude the remedies which would normally 
apply. The attitude of the law was that if you were willing to agree to 
having no protection under the contract, that was your own business, 
unless you were misled into making such an agreement, or otherwise 
had your free will overborne.
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In both these situations, what you have in m odern developed law 
are the logical products of early legal concepts, namely freedom of 
contract and consensus ad idem. So, in a sense, you could say that in 
cases which involved situations of these kinds, the law was clear. 
The contract was to be upheld and enforced even though one party 
might suffer unpleasant consequences, or some financial or other loss. 
The terms o f the contract might be harsh. It might have been foolish 
for the party now going to suffer to have entered into such an arrange­
ment, but the attitude o f the law was plain: the courts do not rewrite 
contracts. They do not protect the foolish or foolhardy. Look out for 
yourself. Caveat emptor. And so on.
More recently, however, there has been a change. The courts 
are beginning to take into account factors other than mistake, fraud, 
and coercion o f the old, crude type. They are prepared to state that 
certain aspects of a contract cannot be excluded by agreement, so as 
to render a party immune from liability if he does not perform  them. 
It is unnecessary to discuss the technical features o f these matters. 
Suffice it to say that what the courts are doing, even when they 
clothe their thoughts and views in technical language which makes it 
appear that their decisions are inherently justified by older authority 
and doctrines established earlier, is saying that it is unthinkable — i.e., 
contrary to everyday morality and good sense — to enforce such 
agreements regardless of the consequences of such enforcement. 
Such contracts must be revised, rewritten, or reconstructed in order 
to make them reasonable. If  they cannot be so treated, then they are 
bad and must be ignored. They are unenforceable; they do not create 
binding obligations.
T he courts are looking beyond the mere fact o f seemingly valid 
agreement or consensus, and are examining the underlying morality of 
upholding and enforcing certain types of contracts. Apart from the 
equitable interferences previously mentioned, there have always been 
reasons for denying validity to some contracts; for example, that they 
were contrary to law or public policy, such as contracts to commit crimes, 
or contracts in restraint of trade, or contracts to commit immoral acts 
such as prostitution. Now they seem to be striking at other contracts, 
which do not offend in these ways. Why? And how?
This is the crux of the matter for our present purposes. What is the 
justification for overturning settled doctrines o f law and causing the concept 
o f contract, as previously understood, to mean something else? Instead of 
a contract meaning an agreement that conforms to certain formal require­
ments or essential features, we must now speak of a contract as an 
agreement that is acceptable to the courts as being just, fair and reasonable 
(as well as conforming to the older pre-requisites). We have now, in 
effect, a more flexible, nebulous notion o f contract. It is the basic 
notion of agreement or consent that is at the heart o f contract. In this 
respect the courts feel that it is much more necessary to subject that
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notion to greater scrutiny and develop in more depth an understanding 
of what is meant by “agreem ent”.
The impetus towards this comes, I think, from the change in the 
nature o f society. The age of the common man has led to the age of 
consumerism. Contract, a type of ju ral relationship into which only a 
small and wealthy segment of society formerly entered (in the days 
before progressive societies moved from status to contract, in the 
famous words o f Sir Henry Maine16), has become one which many people 
of all classes, wealthy and poor, intelligent and otherwise, become involved 
in as a matter of course.
It would have been in keeping with previous views on morality 
to leave the law of contract unchanged. After all, if the basis of the 
older law was the moral principle, pacta sunt servanda, then it should not 
make any difference whether such pacta were between individuals, 
corporations, public bodies, or whomsoever you will. If justice requires 
that like cases be treated alike, then the character of a contracting 
party should not make any difference if the contract is otherwise of the 
same order. There appears to be prevalent nowadays, however, the 
view that justice demands some differentiation between contracting 
parties and contractual situations, even though outwardly such dif­
ferences may not exist in formalistic terms. It seems to me what we are 
seeing in operation is the application of some “new” morality to the law of 
contract. The older principles of law could solve the problems, but 
might achieve an unjust result if they were applied. Hence the need 
to invent new doctrines, or modify or adapt old ones, in order to 
prevent injustice being perpetrated by too rigid an application of the 
strict doctrines of the law. This “new” morality coula be said to be 
drawn from the needs o f m odern society, the newer relationships that 
have come about in recent decades, or from much earlier notions of 
“commercial” morality that have been articulated, or have been an 
inarticulate premise of the law, in the past.
I shall return  later to this question o f morality and its relations 
with justice. Let me first deal with the examples taken from the law 
of torts. One o f these is the question o f liability for pure economic loss.
By a long, slow process the common law gradually evolved a 
concept of liability to compensate for harm caused through physical 
acts committed negligently, even though there was no special contractual 
or other relationship between the parties concerned, save for the 
physical nexus established by the negligent act and the eventual suf­
fering o f the harm. Until recently, however, there was a great reluctance 
on the part o f the courts to extend such liability to cases where only 
economic loss was suffered, in the absence o f any physical injury to a 
person or his property. There were logical reasons for this and the
“ Sir Henry Maine. Ancient Law (London: Murray, 1905), chap. V, p. 161.
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precedents were against it. Ultimately, the courts in England and Canada 
came to the conclusion that to draw any distinction between physical 
and economic injury was absurd. As long as the essential ingredients 
for negligence liability could be established, the nature of the injury 
or loss suffered by the victim should not make any difference to the 
issue of the wrongdoer’s liability. Essential to the victim’s case was the 
existence o f a duty of care owed to him by the wrongdoer. What this 
involved, very shortly and succinctly for present purposes, was foresight 
of the possible injury to the victim; ue., injury o f the kind suffered in 
the result.
Out o f such cases, however, there arose another problem. Suppose 
an injury to X, to whom damage, whether physical or economic, was 
foreseeable, could or did cause some economic loss to Y as a direct or 
even foreseeable consequence. Should the negligent party who damaged 
X also be liable to Y? For example, I break a water pipe carrying 
water to your factory. This is caused by my negligent use of a mechanical 
shovel. The pipe belongs to the municipality, not to you, but because 
it is broken there is no water for your factory for several days, during 
which time you have to close down and lose a lot of money in orders 
unfulfilled. Perhaps your workmen lose their wages for that time. 
Should I be liable not only to the municipality for damaging its pipe 
but to you (and maybe your workers) for your economic loss?
These various forms of loss are all directly brought about by my 
original negligent act. They are also foreseeable, in the light of modern 
conditions, and the common knowledge of the average, reasonable man. 
On the application of what may be termed traditional negligence tests, 
or classical tort analysis, one would think that there ought to be liability 
for all these different losses. Why, and how, should, or can, the law 
differentiate between the various injured parties?
This is still a very vexed issue in the m odern law of torts. What is 
o f concern in the present context are the conflicting principles that 
might be applied in its ultimate resolution. First of all, there is the 
possible attitude that a wrongdoer should be made to compensate those 
injuriously affected by his wrongdoing. On that basis everyone who 
suffered because I was negligent should have a claim against me in 
respect to his or her specific loss. Secondly, there is the argum ent that 
to make me liable indefinitely might be both unreasonable and even 
unprofitable. It would be unreasonable because there is something 
innately unsound about holding a person guilty and responsible for 
everything that follows from his act or omission. It might be unprofit­
able to make me liable so extensively for two reasons: first, it might 
discourage me from ever doing anything lest I make myself liable for a 
vast outlay by way of damages; secondly, because I might go bankrupt 
if I had to pay everybody, so that in the end no one would get very 
much, if anything. What then do you do about this problem? Should
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conduct that is harm ful lead to legal responsibility in every instance? 
Or should there be occasions when guilt does not involve liability?
T he second example is that of intentionally caused harm which 
does not fall within one o f the recognised categories of tort liability, 
such as conspiracy, inducing a breach o f contract, or intimidation. 
The issue is whether every time I deliberately cause you economic 
loss I should be responsible in law, even though my conduct does not 
amount to some form of accepted tortious behaviour. Again, we observe 
a conflict in the law. The principles which have emanated from the 
precedents would restrict or confine tort liability in certain well-defined 
channels. Outside of these, harm which is caused to another, albeit 
wrong in a moral sense, is considered by common law to be damnum 
absque injuria. There is also considerable feeling, in m odern times 
especially, when there have been new developments which make it clear 
how much damage can be inflicted on others, and which in many ways 
are not presently amenable to the jurisdiction of the law, that tne law 
should be able to require people who act in such ways to compensate 
those injured as a consequence.
Yet again there is a conflict, not only between two approaches 
to the resolution of a legal problem, but also between two opposing 
ends or principles underlying the law. T o provide a remedy whenever 
one person suffers economic harm through the deliberate misconduct 
of another might be laudable. How far do you take this? What sort of 
connection should there be between the original act of the alleged 
wrongdoer and the ultimate harm in respect o f which compensation is 
sought? How direct should it be? If it is regarded narrowly, some 
deserving injured parties might be remediless. If  it is looked upon as 
being enough if there is any kind o f historical connection between act 
and consequence, as well as the requisite intention, it might be found 
that the net o f responsibility is being cast too wide. It might lead to 
excessive penalisation or stultification of actions, in the same way as 
was seen earlier in relation to economic harm caused negligently. 
There is a difference, o f course. He who acts deliberately to cause harm 
may merit harsher treatm ent than he who is merely careless or neglectful. 
Is this sufficient difference? On what basis?
So we come to the crux of these problems. How do the courts 
determine what conduct is to be tortious, and thus susceptible to an 
action to provide compensation? Can they create new forms of liability, 
beyond the range of earlier, pre-existing ones? If so, on what grounds? 
Are they limited by the doctrine of precedent, by the settled, received 
law? O r are they free to go further? How free? This is very much 
the same sort of issue as mentioned earlier in connection with con­
tractual doctrines and the ability of the courts to overthrow settled 
principles o f the law, upset contracts otherwise valid, or deny validity 
to agreements which, strictly speaking, conform to all the requirements of 
the law of contract. Once again we are faced with the question: 
what can the courts do, and on what basis?
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CONCLUSIONS
These four situations illustrate what I was speaking o f previously. 
They exemplify the two possibilities. In the contract cases, the courts 
have been asked to forego settled law, and the logical deductions 
that ought to have been made from earlier authorities, in order to 
provide what might be considered to be a juster, fairer result in certain 
instances. In the tort cases, the courts have been asked to provide 
a remedy — and therefore, justice — in cases which are not strictly 
covered by earlier precedents, and require for their solution either a 
determination that the law does not cover such instances, which is a 
denial of justice to injured parties, or the invention or creation of law 
to permit justice to be done to those who have suffered loss.
It is not as simple as that, however. Giving justice to the party 
suffering if the contract is enforced in all its strictness, or to the party 
undergoing injury or loss, means — or involves, perhaps — the denial 
of justice to a party who has contracted on the faith and in the belief 
that he has made a binding arrangem ent that will fix and determine 
the relationship between himself and the o ther contracting party, or 
the denial of justice to the party who has acted on the footing and belief 
that he was not doing anything that would involve him in liability. 
Thus, in a sense, the resolution o f such instances on the basis of 
justice to the ‘injured’ party may involve the breach or overthrow of 
one of two allegedly fundamental principles or standards of law: 
pacta sunt servanda and nulla poena sine lege.
Such principles have not emerged out o f nowhere. They are not 
uttered simply for effect. Presumably they enshrine what may be con­
ceived of as an important basis upon which any rational and just system 
of law should be founded. The cases which I have given as illustrations 
raise the problem of whether such principles are absolute and necessary 
parts of our legal system, or may be qualified or reinterpreted in 
suitable instances. This is a real, and not an imaginary or academic, 
problem. The application of such principles, which presumably are 
designed to promote justice, may lead to injustice in a concrete instance. 
Their rejection in a given instance, for the purpose of ensuring that 
justice be done with respect to a particular party, or class o f parties, 
may produce concrete justice but may cause an infringement of abstract 
justice. Which is to be preferred? Is it possible to reconcile both?
In a sense this is also the question which permeates the recent 
debates of Hart, Dworkin and others. We find either a conflict of 
rules — such as, valid contracts should be enforced — with principles — 
such as, nobody should take advantage o f his own wrong — or a conflict 
of principles — such as, every wrong has a remedy, but nulla poena sine 
lege. The judge has to make a choice. How does he do it? He may find 
the answer in the bowels of the precedents. By skilful management of 
the language of earlier judges, he might be able to obtain guidance
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towards the end which he should be pursuing. Insofar as he can 
discover such guidance, and can claim to be bound by the doctrine of 
precedent (or, if you prefer, insofar as he can avoid the burden of 
choice), then he has solved his problem. He has made no choice, or, 
if you like, he has chosen by choosing not to choose.
Where precedents are lacking or are insufficient to solve his 
problem, then the judge must look elsewhere for guidance in the 
resolution o f his problem. He is faced with a conflict of fundamental 
principles, either of which could be applied to settle the dispute, and 
Doth of which are equally binding, and equally “normative”. To what 
source is he entitled to go to resolve his difficulty by making his 
choice? Is there any rational or other basis upon which he makes it? 
This is where Hart and the others differ inter se, as well as where they 
differ from realists, natural lawyers, sociological jurists, and others. 
And this, I suggest, is where the question of the morality of the common 
law comes into the picture.
Professor Lon Fuller provides us with an outline of what he terms 
“the morality upon which the law is made possible”.17 He gives some 
basic notions which underlie the concept of law, insofar as it may be 
said to have any moral basis whatsoever. Expressly or impliedly in 
what he writes can be found the idea that general principles, such as 
pacta sunt servanda, are part of that underlying foundation of morality 
without which there cannot be acceptable law, at least as we in the 
common law system understand law. Why is this?
There are various possible answers: for instance, that such principles 
ensure that the law treats equal situations equally — which is often 
said to be an essential feature of justice, or justice according to law; 
or, that once a man has given his word he ought to be bound by it, 
unless there is a valid, moral reason for releasing him from such 
obligation — which is a strictly moral approach to law; or, that social 
policy, the foundations of civilised society, the society which we have 
evolved, demand that agreements be kept, else the fabric of that society 
will crumble; or, that the political structure of our society is founded 
on the notion that agreements will be maintained, since the very consti­
tutional set-up from which all else stems is based upon some tacit, 
if not express, agreement as to the way in which our society, our State, 
is organised, and once you say that agreements are not necessarily 
binding, you open the way to the breakdown of society and the State; 
or, you could say that it is an observed fact o f society that agreements 
are usually kept, whence it may be derived empirically, or socio­
logically, that such a concept is fundamental, and rightly ranks as one 
of the key principles underlying the law. The same kind of exposition 
can be made with respect to the doctrine of nulla poena, and any others 
that come to mind in the same category.
1’Fuller, Tht Morality of Law, supra, chap. II.
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The judges, presumably, know all this. Indeed they may have 
enunciated it at one moment of time or another, giving one or more of 
these reasons as the justification for (a) their attitude on a particular 
problem, and (b) its ultimate resolution. Professors Hart and Dwo.kin, 
on the other hand, would deny this. They repudiate any such new­
fangled version of the old doctrine of “natural law”. When Dworkin 
speaks of political morality or institutional morality in connection with 
background rights underlying other, both abstract and concrete, rights, 
he, presumably, is using such expressions to denote “extra-legal” 
considerations, not logically part and parcel of the concept or definition 
of law. When Hart writes of a “principle of recognition” from the use 
of which the judges can discover and justify the law that they invoke 
and apply, he, presumably, is also seeking to discover a logical, or 
sociological, basis for a legal system, not one that is rooted in natural 
law concepts or ideas.
That, indeed, may be the case, or the intention, of those writers. 
I would respectfully suggest, however, that the apparent or alleged 
distinction between what is extra-legal, and what is not, is capable of 
being blurred. So far as Hart is concerned, it has been suggested18 
that his primary rules o f obligation — the guts of the law so to speak — 
involve much of a moral character, while both his primary and his 
secondary rules (of which the principle of recognition is a good example) 
involve a general recognition o f a moral obligation to obey the law — 
which, in a sense, brings into play, once again, the whole notion of 
natural law. With respect to Dworkin, if political or institutional 
morality is of such importance with regard to the discovery of principles 
by a judge who has to determine “hard cases”, and if such morality 
is at the back o f all legal rights, then, once again, how completely 
or successfully has he been able to exclude or dispense with some 
concept of natural law in his analysis of law and judicial functions? 
What I suggest, therefore, is that Dworkin’s ideas, much like those of 
Hart, really amount to a re-presentation of earlier ideas of natural rights 
(which is another version o f natural law) dressed up in a different guise. 
What he is doing is very much a case of “old wine in new bottles” — 
which is why I referred earlier to his theories as “pseudo-novel”.
Despite these, and other, efforts to eradicate the notion from the 
language and reasoning of jurisprudence, it seems to me that, whatever 
its true meaning (and it has had different meanings at different 
historical periods), “natural law” in some shape or form must always 
be a part of our understanding o f law. Indeed, the very principles 
of Hart and Dworkin, the ideas which they have propounded, seem 
to partake of such “natural law” (albeit in a modified form). That 
they do, in my view, suggests that, disguised though it might sometimes 
be, there is a moral basis for law — at least the law which we understand
"Lovin, Hart and the Morality of Law, supra.
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and apply in the common law world. This is just what Deschenes, C.J., 
said in the recent Q uebec case to which I have re fe rre d :19
T o pretend to deny the natural law in the heart o f  man, would be to cut the 
positive legislation from any moral inspiration and to deprive it o f  any tie with 
an order o f  superior values which our society believes in and aspires to 
legitimately. T he Court refuses to sanction such barbarous surgery.
However, as with the moral system, so with the legal: there are 
conflicting principles that are difficult, if not sometimes impossible, to 
reconcile. It is this undeniable fact that creates problems with regard 
to the role of morality in law, the question that has arisen as to the 
“validity” of a legal system — such as that which obtained and operated 
in Germany during the existence of the Nazi regime — and the general 
conflict between positivist and natural law theories of law. If there 
were no such conflicts, there would be much less scope for disagree­
ment as to the nature and effect of law, or as to the true, underlying 
basis o f law. The conflicts exist, however. All that a court can do 
(since courts have to deal with the actual, the practical, the immediately 
necessary, and not the ideal, the desirable, and the ultimate reaches 
of conduct) is to make some practical adjustment between such con­
flicting principles and render judgm ents that are, if not the best 
that can be conceived of, at least the best that can be achieved.
The search for justice is not a search for the absolute. It is a 
search for the most reasonable, after balancing all the various con­
flicting moral principles that could apply.20 The role of the law is 
compromise. This, I venture to suggest, is a more succinct, if less 
elegant, way of putting what Dworkin and Sartorius have expressed in 
their attempts to define and describe what courts do when they decide 
‘hard cases’, in terms of finding the solution that is most consistent 
with the underlying principles of the legal system. The doctrine of 
precedent, for example, is one tool which the courts employ in their 
search for the just and the reasonable. Precedent is an aspect of 
justice, because such a doctrine assists in the attainment of the ideal 
o f treating like cases, and persons, alike. It does not always work, 
but it works more often than it fails.
At some stage, however, as we have seen, the doctrine fails to help. 
Indeed, it may obfuscate or prevent the attainment of the ideal of 
justice. When that occurs it may be necessary to appeal from the 
unsophisticated notion of precedent to the more glamorous 01 exotic 
ideas of the ‘higher’ morality. In other words, from the strictness of 
legal doctrine to the nebulous and less constricting notions of “justice”, 
“fairness” or “doing right”.
'*Suf/ra, footnote 2, at 651; see also Chabot v. School Commission of Mamorandiere (1957), 12 D.L.R. 
(2d) 796.
,#But the task o f the judge may be looked upon differently, v it, as settling disputes, by some 
appropriate means, or as making law or policy; see Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 
(1968) 46 C.B.R. 405; Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Makmg, (1970) 48 C.B.R. 1.
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This is sometimes expressed in terms of making a so-called 
“policy” decision. There are many modern instances, notably in the 
law of tort, when appeal has been made to the idea of “policy”. 
Indeed, in the law of contract, and elsewhere, there is sometimes an 
appeal to a general notion of “public policy” in order to determine 
issues of contractual validity. It seems to me that there is something 
both confusing and even hypocritical about referring to what is being 
done as making a decision on the basis o f policy. What, after all, is 
meant by “policy”? Whose policy? How is it discovered? What are its 
ingredients? How do judges know what policy is, or ought to be?
The courts ought to be deciding cases before them on the basis of 
“justice” (leaving open for the moment what is meant by that term). 
The very minimal content of justice, I would suggest, is provided by 
some sort o f doctrine o f precedent. The moment you abandon such 
doctrine, you set sail without navigational aids upon a sea of unknown 
depths and bounds. If precedent is abandoned, then, in its place, 
the courts ought to be looking for, and paying .egard to, some other 
aspects of justice, since treating like cases alike does not exhaust 
the content of the concept ‘justice’, in view of the fact that not all 
cases are or can be alike, or even sufficiently similar, to render other 
principles or aspects of justice unnecessary.
“Policy”, I suggest, although it may seem to be intended to serve 
such purpose, does not. If  you examine what the courts have said or 
done in the name of policy, what you find is that they are appealing 
to various social, economic, or practical factors which they regard as 
indicating the way a particular decision ought to go. Policy, in other 
words, is perhaps only another way of saying expediency — or at least, 
what the particular judge in the particular case thinks of as being 
expedient. One of the most famous arguments against the creation of 
liability in certain instances — i.e., that it would open the floodgates 
of litigation to permit such action — is an argum ent of policy or 
expediency. It has been successful at various times, but later courts 
have often rejected that argum ent in the particular situation, and have 
succumbed to the request for a remedy. Obviously, all judges at all 
times do not have the same views on expediency. That is why “policy” 
is such a bad explanation, or basis, on which to make law and determine 
unsolved problems. The use of the notion of policy is not the way to 
achieve justice. Indeed, justice and policy, so far from being allied 
or similar, may turn out to be in opposition. It may not be politic 
to endeavour to do that which is just. Policy may dictate a solution 
that does not advance justice, and vice versa.
There may be one construction or interpretation of “ policy”, 
however, that does make it accord more with the notion of justice. 
That is if “policy” is understood to mean not what is expedient or 
practical, but what is consistent with the general trend o f the law, and
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is deducible, if not in logic, then at least as a m atter of sentiment, 
from what has gone before. If it is accepted that the existing rules 
of the law are founded upon a desire to achieve justice, and are 
organised along such lines, then new rules, if they are harmonious 
with the previous ones, should also be just, or capable of giving a just 
result. The court must, therefore, look to the nature and heart of 
the rules, in order to discover not only their superficial content, but 
also their purpose or policy. Once it has done this, it can reason 
further towards the application or adaptation of such rules to the 
case before it.
This, indeed, is the morality of the common law. It is the inner, 
harmonious order of the rules from which further developments can 
take place. As Lord Mansfield, a great proponent of both natural 
law and the moral content and purpose of the law, once said: “The 
reason and spirit of cases make law, not the letter of particular 
precedent”. While accepting that it is no easy task to discover such 
“reason and spirit”, what I have called the inner, harmonious order of 
the rules of law, I would nevertheless argue that to do so is not beyond 
the wit of judges, and indeed, is the very onerous task which is placed 
upon them in the judicial role.
Hence, in making decisions of a particularly difficult nature, where, 
perhaps, the precedents do not provide totally adequate guidelines, 
they must have certain doctrines or principles foremost in their minds. 
As has been pointed out by some commentators, when statutory provisions 
are in question, the canons of construction in effect give the court the 
necessary guidance. Such elementary, basic notions as construing penal 
statutes strictly, and presuming that a statute does not abrogate common 
law rights unless it states so specifically and clearly, are in fact the 
kind o f moral underpinnings of the law that reveal which way it is 
supposed to be going, and how it is meant to be understood and 
applied.
Where the common law is concerned, there are similar, if not 
always as clear, indications of what the law is about and how it should 
be interpreted and utilised. Agreements must be kept; true, but they 
should not be made the instruments of oppression, so as to permit one 
party to exercise unreasonable control over another who has no true 
freedom to bargain and make an agreement. Penalties should not be 
imposed upon someone when such penalties did not exist previously; 
true, but a person who acts deliberately to harm, or in a negligent 
fashion, knows that sometimes, in some circumstances, he may be 
liable if he causes harm. He is not totally unaware or ignorant of 
the prospect of liability. Accordingly, it is not unjust to make him liable 
ex post facto , as it were, in such situations. He is not to be treated in 
the same m anner as the man who is legitimately oblivious of the 
possibility that his conduct may be somehow wrongful. (This would 
be the case, for example, if the courts suddenly said that all injuries
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were actionable, even if they were totally accidental. There have been 
times when such liability was the case, and at a period when the 
prevailing morality of the law was in favour of such strict liability. 
Some vestigial aspects o f this philosophy can be found embedded in 
our law — though they are gradually being absorbed by other doctrines; 
the morality of the law of tort in modern times is not that of a hundred 
or two hundred years ago).
In the same way other areas of the law have undergone change 
in the light of different views of the ultimate purpose and morality 
which they serve. Such developments, I suggest, indicate the extent to 
which the law constantly strives to achieve certain moral standards 
consistent with the underlying basis of the society which it organises, 
regulates, and administers.21 If the judges are not exactly the guardians 
of the morality of society, they are sometimes the beacons which light 
the way for society to find the path towards what is right and just. 
And the common law, which they expound and apply, notwithstanding 
Mr. Justice Holmes, is “a brooding omnipresence in the sky”.
tlC f the remarks of Lord Diplork, dissenting, in Hyam v. DP.P., [1975] A.C. 55 a) 89, .cited wilh 
approval by Lord Edmund-Davies in D P.P. v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653 at 716.
